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Roger Bernhardt begins: If the enforce-
ability of local exactions imposed by communi-
ties on developers to promote affordable hous-
ing in their environs interests you, then do read 
the decision in Building Industry Association v 
City of Patterson, 171 Cal App 41h 886, given 
its entertaining facts, its complicated logic, and 
its ominous implications for this cause. The 
decision was rendered by a Court of Appeal 
in March, and in June, the California Supreme 
Court denied review and refused to de-publish 
it. 
As for the facts, in 2003 a developer and 
a city signed a development agreement for the 
construction of 214 residential housing units. 
The agreement called for the developer to pay 
an affordable housing in lieu fee of $734 per 
unit - or more as determined by a "revised fee 
schedule, including indexing as provided by 
ordinance at the time of the adoption of the fee, 
providing the same is reasonably justified". 
The affordable housing fee had origi-
nally been set at $319 per unit in 1995, but had 
been increased to $734 in 2001, based upon 
a "leverage" study that assumed that the city 
would only need to itself cover 9% of the cost 
of subsidizing affordability. But then, a second 
study, in 2005, went off the rails: it concluded 
that, based upon a "needs assessment" of all of 
Stanislaus County, the City of Patterson needed 
to develop 642 units of affordable housing 
- which would cost a total of $73.5 million! 
Since there were only 3500 "unentitled" resi-
dentiallots yet available in the city, the price of 
subsidizing each affordable unit would require 
imposing a charge of $20,946 on each of 
those undeveloped lots, not $743, as originally 
thought. So the fee was increased from $743 to 
$20,946 on each of the developers 214 lots. 
A trial court found that the City's "meth-
odology" was reasonable, and upheld it, but the 
Court of Appeal reversed that decision, and 
invalidated the new fee. Its opinion went out 
of its way to avoid taking any easy way out. 
The court declined to hold that the developer 
had any vested rights to the earlier, lower fee, 
given the specific language of the development 
agreement. It also held that under the develop-
ment agreement, the City was free to charge 
any new fee that was "reasonably justified", and 
was not required to abide by the earlier leverage 
formula it had used in originally calculating that 
fee. Nor could the developer get itselfprotected 
by a heightened constitutional scrutiny theory 
a la NollanlDolan; based on the California 
Supreme Court decision of San Remo Hotel v 
San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 2002, the City of 
Patterson was only required to show "a reason-
able relationship between the amount of the fee, 
as increased, and the 'deleterious public impact 
of the development.'" 
Using that kind of test, the court "locat-
ed nothing that demonstrates or implies the 
increased fee was reasonably related to the need 
for affordable housing associated with the proj-
ect." .... No connection is shown ... between this 
642 figure and the need for affordable housing 
associated with new market rate development." 
Since the city failed to demonstrate any reason-
able relationship between the new fee and any 
deleterious impact connected to the project, it 
was invalid 
Technically, one can read this decision 
as holding merely that the city's interpretation of 
a development agreement that it executed with 
a developer was incorrect, but I took it to say 
that a town's entire affordable housing impact 
fee-whether imposed by way of a develop-
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ment agreement or by an across-the-board ordi-
nance—might not pass constitutional muster. 
To get an outside perspective on this 
case, I turned to David L. Callies, the Kudo 
Professor of Law at the University of Hawaii’s 
William S. Richardson School of Law. Given 
his credentials, it made more sense for me to ask 
the questions and have him give the answers. 
So, David, what is your reading of Patterson?
David Callies: The latter. Moreover, it 
seems to me the reasoning of the case applies 
not only to housing set-asides/fees/exactions, 
but all land development conditions/in lieu/
mitigation fees. Although Nollan/Dolan inter-
mediate scrutiny may not apply, the court is 
clearly requiring some demonstrable connection 
between a problem caused by the development/
developer and the fee/set-aside.
RB: But isn’t there the notion that 
across-the-board, wide-ranging impositions, 
especially those legislatively enacted, should 
survive judicial scrutiny more successfully than 
individualized, adjudicative decisions that come 
out of appointees in agencies?  If that applies 
here, might Patterson be better able to do by 
ordinance what it could not get away with in a 
development agreement?
DC: True, if legislatively enacted accord-
ing to the California Supreme Court in Ehrlich 
v Culver City (1996) 12 C4th 854, 50 CR2d 
242, though I admit to the same puzzlement 
as Justice Thomas in his dissent from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Parking 
Ass’n of Georgia v City of Atlanta (1995) 515 
US 1116, 1117, 132 L Ed 2d 273, 274, 115 S Ct 
2268: Certainly, legislative bodies can impose 
conditions that are just as unconstitutional as 
those imposed by administrative agencies. The 
rest of the California Supreme Court’s Ehrlich 
decision is a stark example of what results from 
the mindless application of legislative defer-
ence: upholding the levying of a public art fee 
on the developer of a small condominium com-
plex, without any attempt to link that develop-
ment with a presumably public desire for public 
art. How does any private development even 
remotely drive a need for art?
RB: Getting to the merits of the fee 
formula itself, the opinion’s requirement that 
the city demonstrate a “reasonable relationship 
between the amount of the fee, as increased,” 
and the “deleterious public impact of the devel-
opment” looks like it might be a possibly insur-
mountable hurdle.   What do you think of the 
idea of calculating the housing fee by 1) starting 
with an estimate of the countywide need for 
affordable housing,  2) allocating 642 affordable 
housing units to this town, 3) estimating each 
unit to require a subsidy of $55,000-$165,000 
(for moderate or low income householders), 
for a total of $73.5 million; and then 4) spread-
ing out that total subsidy cost among the 3500 
remaining unbuilt lots in the town, in order 5) 
to get to a fee of $21,000 on each new building 
permit? Do you think that will ever be upheld as 
a legitimate way to start?
DC: We don’t get to proportionality if 
there is no nexus. However, even if one gets past 
nexus, the suggested calculation above places 
the entire burden for affordable housing on new 
development—which, I suspect, will not pass 
even a watered-down version of a proportion-
ality test. Thus, for example, why should all 
unbuilt units pay an identical impact fee? Why 
shouldn’t the city pay a substantial portion of 
the cost of affordable housing, once the fee has 
been separated from the need for lack of nexus? 
Note that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
was impressed by the City of Sacramento’s 
willingness to pay half the cost of the affordable 
housing need generated by the proposed hotel 
(according to the city’s studies) in Commercial 
Builders of N. Cal. v City of Sacramento (9th 
Cir 1991) 941 F2d 872.
continued on page 9
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RB: So are you saying that you think a 
court (or this court) is saying that there is no 
nexus, or the nexus logic in this case didn’t 
work?
DC: The latter. The court found no 
demonstrable relationship between the housing 
fee and the public impact of the contemplated/
proposed residential development. Therefore, 
considering proportionality—the size of the 
fee—in this circumstance is moot.
RB. Let’s look at some of the particular 
components of the fee formula themselves. 
How does a proactive community justifiably 
estimate its local need for affordable housing? 
Can it just accept the number given to it by its 
county or regional government agency? If there 
is no such higher authority to give it a number, 
is there a way for it calculate its own number? 
Would it have to make a census of its residents 
and then derive the shortfall mathematically by 
comparing the median income of its residents 
with the median cost of its housing? Given the 
emphasis on regional housing needs, wouldn’t 
the city also have to look at the economic situ-
ation of the outsiders who might like to move 
into town but cannot afford to do so?
DC: The issue is not the community’s 
need, but the legality/constitutionality of the 
mechanism that it chooses to use to attempt 
to meet that need. Extracting (some would say 
extorting) the housing necessary to satisfy that 
need from a housing provider of more expensive 
housing is a tax, pure and simple: It is a means 
of raising revenue or its equivalent. Impact fees, 
exactions, and dedications, on the other hand, 
represent exercises of the police power, not the 
power to tax and raise revenues. The city is enti-
tled to meet those “needs” through land devel-
opment fees and exactions only if those “needs” 
are generated by the proposed development. If 
the development is commercial, then depending 
on the nature of that commercial use, the Ninth 
Circuit’s City of Sacramento decision methodol-
ogy would be apt: Do a study that determines 
the number of low-income employment oppor-
tunities generated by the development and the 
shortage of available affordable housing to 
meet that development-generated need, and then 
assess the commercial development a share of 
the cost incurred to meet that need.
RB: Assuming that it comes up with a 
formula that works, how does a community that 
does create some affordable housing allocate 
it? Since it clearly can’t reduce housing costs 
across the board for everybody, how does it 
decide who the winners are, i.e. those who get 
to move in to the new units? Auctions probably 
would be self-defeating, so should it to go lot-
teries or waiting lists? And who should be in 
the pool of eligible winners; can only existing 
residents get on the list?
DC: The mechanism simply needs to be 
fair; going beyond residents, however, abandons 
any pretense of justification based on communi-
ty need. Since community need is the only basis 
for levying such a fee in the first place, only 
residents should be counted in determining that 
need. Lotteries are pretty random methods for 
determining who is entitled to a limited amount 
of affordable housing. Better to use waiting lists 
with each resident’s position on it based upon a 
combination of factors like current income and 
family size.
RB: The biggest issue for me is: How 
can a city ever show a “deleterious public 
impact” from a housing development that cre-
ates a need for affordable housing? I can see the 
linkage between industrial or commercial devel-
opments and affordable housing, but where is 
there any nexus when the new development is 
residential instead? Do the new middle-class 
homeowners moving in need to have their maids 
and gardeners not have to commute from too far 
away? (And in that case, a better solution might 
continued on page 10
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be larger houses with servants’ quarters rather 
than lower priced housing somewhere else.) 
DC: That’s the point: The city can’t 
show a deleterious impact on affordable hous-
ing resulting from a residential development.-
There isn’t any. I think these mechanisms won’t 
hold up in court anywhere, and following the 
Patterson decision and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lingle v Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (2005) 
544 US 528, 161 L Ed 2d 876, 125 S Ct 2074, 
I don’t think they’re constitutional in California 
either.
RB: Might these issues be any easier 
with a different formula? Might an inclusionary 
zoning ordinance that just requires developers 
to set aside of some percentage of units for low 
or moderate income housing more safely sur-
vive the Patterson standard?
DC: Inclusionary zoning in the context 
you suggest is both illusory and misplaced.-The 
concept was originally used against recalci-
trant local governments (as in the New Jersey 
Mt. Laurel litigation (South Burlington County 
NAACP v Mount Laurel (NJ 1975) 336 A2d 
713)) that failed to provide for a fair share of 
affordable housing by, among other things, 
zoning only for middle to high-end housing. To 
turn it on its head and apply it to a landowner 
developer is flawed from the beginning.
RB: Could affordability be brought 
about by a tax instead, say, an excise tax on the 
privilege of developing land? That would be 
harder in California, because of Proposition 13, 
but since the town’s residents (those who vote) 
already live in completed houses that would not 
be subject to the tax, its financial burden would 
fall only on the owners of undeveloped land, 
who probably don’t vote.
DC: Sure, a tax would solve all the legal 
problems.-It recognizes such housing exactions 
for what they are: revenue-raising measures (as 
opposed to police power exercises) with no con-
nection to the residential project to which they 
are applied.
In sum, the Patterson case requires 
some reasonable connection between a land 
development fee or exaction of any kind and 
a need that the “charged” developer causes by 
reason of its development. Gone are the days 
when a California local government could 
require the payment of such fees and exac-
tions simply because local government had a 
need and the developer needed a development 
permit. Certainly, this is a fair result. No one 
is quarrelling with the public need. The issue 
is—and always has been—who pays, and on 
what basis.
***
   RB. Before we finished polishing the 
comments above, another decision came down 
that we thought ought to be tied in to them. On 
July 22, a different court of appeal rendered its 
decision in Palmer/Sixth Street  v City of Los 
Angeles, 175 Cal.App.4th 1396. What had hap-
pened there was that in 1991 the city of Los 
Angeles had adopted a specific plan for the 
preservation of the low income characteristics 
of one of its neighborhoods, requiring that the 
demolition of any low income housing there had 
to be offset by construction of new affordable 
housing either subject to rent control or else by 
payment of an in lieu fee of $80000-$100000 
for each unit so lost.  This 60 unit building had 
been torn down in 1990, but the City’s specific 
plan reached back to 1988, leading it to include 
in the conditional use permit it issued for the 
developer’s new 350 unit project that it create 
60 replacement low income rental units or pay 
an in lieu fee oh $5.8 million.
Both the trial court and appellate court 
held that the city’s demand violated the vacancy 
The Endangered Future... 
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decontrol requirement of the California Costa 
Hawkins Act, which declares that residential 
landlords may “establish the initial and all sub-
sequent rental rates” for their dwelling units. 
The City’s requirement that 60 of the new units 
be let at affordable rates was therefore in viola-
tion of and preempted by the statute. The in lieu 
fee alternative, although not mentioned in the 
Costa Hawkins act, was so intertwined as to 
be also preempted.  That meant, of course, that 
the city of Los Angeles would be no more suc-
cessful at mandating affordability through rent 
control measures that the city of Patterson had 
been in achieving affordable pricing.
 This is technically a rent control deci-
sion rather than a land-use exaction one, and 
will not be too informative to residents of other 
jurisdictions that lack local rent control ordi-
nances or statewide preemption of it. But the 
court’s holding that a city’s demand on a devel-
oper to replace 60 units of low income housing 
that had been demolished in a particular neigh-
borhood ran afoul of a statutory vacancy decon-
trol mandate seemed to me to demonstrate a 
kind of willingness to stretch out to prohibit 
a local government from overreaching. After 
all, this was not a classic citywide rent control 
ordinance but rather a conditional use permit 
applicable only in special circumstances.  Do 
you agree David?
DC:  Well, sort of.  The circumstances 
are sufficiently odd that it is difficult for me to 
draw any generally-applicable conclusions.  
RB: When this holding is combined 
with Patterson, the future of affordable man-
dates seen even bleaker.  Patterson prohibited 
a city from mandating affordable sale prices, 
and now this case prohibits it from mandating 
affordable rental prices.  Is there anything left?
DC:  Sure:  mandatory set-asides on 
commercial and industrial development that 
really does generate a need for nearby afford-
able/workforce housing, just like the 9th Circuit 
held in the City of Sacramento case way back 
in 1991.  It’s still all about nexus and propor-
tionality.
RB: Well, this case does illustrate a 
situation where the nexus that was missing in 
Patterson might be found.  You and I feared that 
a local government might never be able to sat-
isfy a court of the need to charge a developer for 
affordable housing that it wanted to see built, 
but perhaps it could make such a demand when 
that developer began the project by demolish-
ing some affordable housing that was already 
there?
DC:  Your fear, Roger, not mine.  I never 
did buy the city’s notion as accepted by the 
California Court of Appeals in the Culver City 
case that a socially useful or desirable private 
facility like a sports club (or, for that matter, an 
inexpensive dwelling) becomes affected with 
or coupled to a governmental/public interest 
to which government can attach replacement 
conditions to a demolition or change-of-use 
permit.  If government wants, or the public 
needs (not necessarily the same thing…) low 
income, affordable, workforce housing then 
it can either (1) build it (2) subsidize it or (3) 
provide incentives to the private development 
sector, such as the obviously popular density 
bonus which California authorizes by statute, 
and which, according to a recent study by a 
housing nonprofit, is successfully used by 90% 
of the local government respondents, according 
to its 2004-2005 surveys. 
RB. Oh, well. If that’s all it requires… 
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